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Europe Project Paper #3
European Energy Strategy for Ukraine
by Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky, Director-General of the Economic
Department, Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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The new century put the old problem of reliable supply of oil and
gas on the radars of the world’s most developed economies.
Discussion of the issue took up half the G-8 Summit in St.
Petersburg this past summer. There could not be better place for
such a discussion. Last winter Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia and
Turkey, Germany, several central European states and other members
of the EU were shocked with Russia’s brutal attempt to cut off the
gas supply to Ukraine for political reasons. Disruption was not
caused by a war like in 1973 or in the 1990s; it was not related to
growing consumption by China and India; or to unresolved financial
issues with consumers. It simply was punishment for Ukraine’s
democratic development and pro-western foreign policy. We need look
no further than the media reports earlier this year, and figures
speak for themselves.
Analysts and some government officials in Moscow acknowledge a
correlation between gas prices and political ties in the former
Soviet Union, though Russia’s state-owned natural gas monopoly
disputes that its pricing is politically motivated. Eastern European
and Caucasus countries that signed contracts with set prices for
fuel range from benign Belarus being charged $47 per 1,000 cubic
meters of natural gas to Moldova, which aspires to join the EU and
is battling Russia-backed separatists, charged $160 per 1,000 cubic
meters of natural gas. Ukraine, which aspires to join NATO and the
EU, was offered the price of $220 per 1,000 cubic meters of natural
gas. Kiev refused and delivery of fuel stopped.
Arguments about the necessity to raise prices for Ukraine four-fold
because of the “market conditions” which suddenly became important
in December 2005 could not be accepted seriously for a very simple
reason – there is no gas market in our part of the world. In Western
Europe you can argue about some market conditions since there are at
least two or three suppliers besides Russia (Norway, Great Britain
and Algeria), but in the eastern and central Europe it is Russia
only. Gazprom has bought out all available gas from Central Asia and
constitutes now an almost 100 percent monopoly both for natural gas
resources and its transit in the FSU region up to the Ukrainian
border.
Tensions on the oil and gas markets due to increasing energy
consumption in Asia, political instability in Venezuela and Nigeria,
terrorism-related disruptions in Iraq and Middle East, decreasing
availability of resources in Europe facilitated by the
above-mentioned unexpected move by the Russian Federation made
energy security a top priority for all major consumers, particularly
in Europe. Ukraine occupies an important if not key position in the
energy-supply chain between Russia and Europe with more than 80
percent of the EU’s import of Russian natural gas and oil transiting
through its territory and must decide what kind of policy would
serve best national interests of Ukraine and those of Europe.
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The geopolitical reasons for Ukraine’s choice are simple. It is
difficult to be a servant with two masters, particularly if they
pray to different Gods. On the one hand there is a major trade area
for Ukraine, the European Union of which Ukraine hopes to be part
one day. The EU believes in a transparent market approach and an
integrated diversified network of suppliers, transit facilities and
consumers, although it is true that the EU has not been able to
formulate a coherent energy strategy until now. On the other hand
there is a major single trade partner – Russia – which believes in a
government-controlled energy sector and monopoly on export and
transit routes with a very clear and coherent energy strategy
formulated in 2003. It says that energy will be an important foreign
policy tool aiming to bring Russia back to super-power status. It is
a sovereign right of every country to decide how to use its
resources, but maintaining normal business relations with Russia in
the energy sector should not prevent Ukraine from participating as
profoundly as possible in formulating a common European Energy
Policy, which must include Ukraine.
Adopted earlier this year the EU’s Green Paper “A European Strategy
for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” is not as perfect,
as some scholars think, and needs further elaboration. But this is a
very important document and it is encouraging that Ukraine is
mentioned in it as an “essential strategic partner”. And yet it says
little about the connection between a common European energy
strategy, which is being elaborated and the facilitation of Caspian
oil and gas supplies to the EU through Ukraine and Turkey.
Apparently, the Black Sea region and Caspian basin are crucial in
securing the most real diversification projects for the EU and
therefore deserve full attention.
Europe and its energy partners are interdependent and with respect
to Ukraine it is clearly stated in a bilateral Memorandum of
Understanding on Co-operation in the Field of Energy between Ukraine
and the European Union signed on December 1, 2005. Additionally, the
EU encourages Ukraine together with Turkey to join the South East
European Energy Community Treaty transforming it into a truly
pan-European Energy Community. Ukraine is a member of the Energy
Charter and unlike Russia has ratified its Transit Protocol. Those
documents set up necessary preconditions for the development of a
truly pro-European energy strategy for Ukraine. It must include an
appropriate legal environment, market-based energy policy, practical
steps in developing real projects like Odessa-Brody-Gdansk.
The reality is such that the EU is relatively poor in conventional
energy reserves. Therefore Europe’s economic future depends on a
secure, affordable and sustainable energy supply. But to achieve
this goal it is no longer adequate to assure simple physical
availability of energy sources. Supply policy needs to consider the
immediate and longer-term availability of energy products at a price
which is affordable to all consumers (individuals and industrial),
while respecting environmental and other requirements for
sustainable development. It also needs to take into account trends
in demand in Europe and Asia as well. Analysis done by the European
experts confirms that under current patterns of energy production
and energy use, the European Union is consuming limited reserves at
a rate which compromises the availability of energy to future
generations and threatens the local and global environment.
For the EU, energy supply has an internal dimension and an external
dimension. Internally, as everybody agrees, Europe needs to balance
supply and demand, while respecting environmental, consumer, safety,
political and economic conditions. But Europe is increasingly
dependent on imports and therefore the external dimension prevails.
Best available estimates show that under the current assumptions the
community’s overall import dependency will rise from today’s 50
percent to about 60 to 70 percent in 2020. Especially critical is
import share of oil and natural gas. Imported oil is likely to
increase from 80 percent of total EU oil supply in 1997 to 87
percent in 2010. Gas imports are forecast to rise from 40 percent
today to 66 percent in 2020. Growing imports are not in themselves a
threat to security supply, but they highlight the importance of good
trade links, communication and political relationships with external
partners. Therefore, as the Green Paper says, in recent years the
objective of independence from external energy suppliers has been
replaced by the objective of managing external dependence. European
energy supply faces different forms of risk and its analysis worth
separate consideration. But risk from transit could be easily
eliminated through inclusion of major transit partners, like
Ukraine, into the European energy policy framework.
On the Ukrainian side contribution into a common European policy
means that security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability in
the energy sector is to be provided. In this connection the energy
security principles set by the International Energy Agency are to be
reinforced, particularly concerning upholding of contractual
commitments and application of market-based principles at all stages
of the energy supply chain. At the recent U.S.-EU Summit it was
noted that “diversifying sources of energy and modes/routes of
transit, and ensuring non-discriminatory third-party access to
transit infrastructure will improve the functioning of energy
markets worldwide” while “open, transparent, non-discriminatory and
stable legal conditions that ensure fair and equitable treatment for
energy investment and trade are essential to helping producing and
transit countries meet market demands”. It is difficult to question
that further development of production and export capacities in
producer countries in a safe and secure environment, and the
upgrading of existing and development of new energy transportation
infrastructures by producer and transit countries as well as further
development of refinery capacity in all countries are critical. As
well, it is very important to create a legal framework and
technological monitoring mechanisms to deal with emergency external
supply events, no matter who is the supplier or consumer. This might
include, in particular, emergency oil and gas reserves to compensate
for unforeseen supply disruptions, such as those caused by natural
disasters or politically motivated decisions.
But well before any strategic moves are in progress much simpler
things could be done right away. Namely, proper accounting of
quantity and quality of gas and oil transporting through the
Ukrainian territory must be guaranteed. It is hard to believe but a
project to install measurement gadgets at the entrance and exit
points of the Ukraine’s pipelines was started only recently with
appropriate assistance from the European Commission. Similarly it
was agreed last year with the EU to set a special internationally
certified quality-assessing centre not far from Kyiv to monitor the
quality of gas crossing Ukraine to Europe. Once both projects are
completed Gazprom will not be able to blame Ukraine for “illegal
siphoning” of gas and Europeans will know who is to blame if gas of
improper quality is received.
Ukraine’s energy sector occupies a strategic place in the national
economy and internationally. By cumulative power generation Ukraine
is twelfth in the world. Our proven gas reserves and its production
are comparable with those of Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan but at the
same time we consume more gas than Italy, France, the Netherlands.
To satisfy its own needs, Ukraine has to import up to 60 percent of
the necessary hydrocarbons from Russia with some “input” from
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. (Here it seems appropriate
to note that in spite of some statements in the media, not a
molecule of the Central Asian gas reaches Ukraine or Europe. Buying
good quality Turkmen or Kazakh gas, Russia consumes it itself, while
consumers in Europe receive literally Russian gas only). Having in
mind that Russia maintains a monopoly on the production of nuclear
fuel for the Soviet-designed nuclear power plants, we must recognize
that the Ukrainian energy sector has a very low level of
diversification. It is Ukraine’s transit capacity of 35,600 km of
gas pipelines, which is practically unmatched in the world, that
constitutes the only lever to fight for fair prices and honest
contracts with the Russian monopoly. The transportation capacity of
170 billion cubic meters annually with underground storage
reservoirs with a total capacity of 32 billion cubic meters can
satisfy the current and growing needs in Europe. Therefore any
concession to Gazprom on the issue of a gas transportation
consortium without major international participation will have a
disastrous effect on our ability to secure national and European
interests vis-à-vis Russia.
Geographically Ukraine is well-situated to serve as a transit bridge
between the Caspian basin and Central Asia with it growing
production of hydrocarbons and Europe with its growing consumption.
And quite naturally, Ukraine is to be an active participant of the
major transportation projects in the region. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline is a huge step toward real diversification of export
routes for the land-locked Caspian states, particularly Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan. But if it was not easy with oil, then doubled
efforts are required to develop another diversification project for
natural gas which would bring alternative resources to consumers in
Balkan and central European countries. Such a project exists; it is
the NABUCCO pipeline. Recently the European Commission named this
project among the most strategic for the European Community. It is
envisioned that numerous countries will contribute the necessary
volumes – among them Azerbaijan, Iraq, Egypt, probably Iran, and an
even longer list will serve as a transit route, including Georgia,
Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria. For this project it
is very important to bring Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on board to
secure a stable balance of gas supply. Ukraine can contribute pipes
and equipment and construction experience into joint efforts and
hope to diversify its sources of gas through NABUCCO as well.
Experience in many countries around the globe proves that oil and
gas reserves alone can not bring prosperity and security. The Soviet
Union with its energy might set the best example. The majority of
leading producers and exporting countries can hardly be recognized
as stable and democratic. The Gulf economies are highly dependent on
oil revenues and with no exception lack a vibrant private sector.
Russia shears now leading place with Saudi Arabia in terms of oil
export but oil-dollars brought almost nothing to the average Russian
not to mention technological reconstruction of the Russian industry
or social infrastructure. West Africa has the highest rate of
discovery in the world mostly in the Gulf of Guinea, and the
majority of the growth comes from Nigeria and Angola. But ethnic
clashes inside those countries prevent fair and stable flow of oil
revenues to the economy. Venezuela does not belong to the most
prosperous countries of South America in spite of huge oil and gas
reserves. Probably, only major European producers - Norway and Great
Britain - constitute an exception to this rule. It is apparent that
it is not enough to have oil and gas reserves and maintain energy
infrastructure. It must be combined with investment and
implementation of modern technologies and those two are strongly
connected with political stability. Only through cooperation,
transparent and market-based dialogue and real partnership will the
goals of sustainable development in Europe be achieved. Ukraine will
contribute its part, no doubt about it.
The views and opinions expressed in this Europe Project Paper do not
necessarily reflect those of JINSA.