Why
Do Muslims Execute Innocent People?
Islamist Ideology
by Denis MacEoin
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2006
While often ignored in the
Western media, human rights abuses in the Islamic world are a daily
occurrence. Both Muslim states and ad hoc religious courts order
mutilation and execution, not only of criminals but also of
individuals—mainly women—who have not committed anything which would
be considered a crime in other societies. In some cases, Shari‘a
(Islamic law) tribunals issue death sentences for those acquitted in
regular courts. In other cases, religious leaders invoke religion to
sanction non-Islamic practices such as honor killings and female
genital mutilation.
Original Islamic
jurisprudence, however, does not necessarily mandate such severe
punishments. In the early twentieth century, it even seemed that the
introduction of modern legal codes in Muslim majority countries
might ameliorate regular Shari‘a punishments, but in recent decades,
traditionalists have pushed a back-to-basics program which has
augmented application of Shari‘a punishment. Rather than modifying
Islamic practice, many self-described Islamist reformers make
matters worse by advocating retrenchment rather than reform.
Unjust Punishment
Many of the crimes for which death is mandated
involve sex or honor. While capricious application of Shari‘a
punishment is common throughout Muslim majority countries and
communities, since the fall of the Taliban and because of the
activity of Iranian journalists and bloggers, many of the specific
examples which are known in the West come from Iran.
On August 15, 2004,
16-year-old Ateqeh Rajabi, was hanged in public in the northern
Iranian town of Neka. Her crime was to have sex with her boyfriend.
She had no lawyer, nor could her family find one willing to defend
her. The capriciousness of the judge rather than a strict
interpretation of the Qur'an contributed to her death. She had
talked back to the judge, Haji Reza'i, who later remarked that he
would not have ordered her execution had it not been for her "sharp
tongue.
In December 2004, Leyla, a
19-year-old girl with a mental age of eight, was sentenced to death
for "acts contrary to chastity." The sentencing judge ordered her to
be flogged before execution. Her situation was lamentable. When she
was eight, her mother forced her into prostitution, letting her be
raped repeatedly. She was later sold as a temporary wife (mut'a,
sigha), legal in Twelver Shi‘ite law which allows temporary
wives to be contracted for set periods ranging from one hour to
ninety-nine years. Thirteen-year-old Zhila Izadi also received a
death sentence—later commuted—after being impregnated by her older
brother.
Other examples abound. In
July 2005, Iranian authorities publicly hanged two boys, 18-year-old
Ayaz Marhoni and 16-year-old Mahmud Asghari, in the shrine city of
Mashhad for homosexual acts. Photographs of the boys with nooses
round their necks just before their execution are available online,
but never appeared in Western newspapers or on television.
On January 7, 2006, an
Islamic court in Tehran passed a death sentence on an 18-year old
girl, identified only by her first name, Nazanin. She had stabbed an
assailant while fighting off three men who attempted to rape her and
her 16-year-old niece. Reports suggested their attackers were
members of the Basij, a radical militia charged with upholding the
Islamic Republic's revolutionary principles. Nazanin was aged
seventeen at the time of her offence, too young for a death sentence
even under Iranian law that states that such sentences for minors
should be commuted to five years' imprisonment. In Nazanin's case,
the judge ignored extenuating circumstances and applied rigidly the
law of retaliation (qisas). Under such a system, a life must
be paid for by a life, an eye for an eye, except where the family of
the victim is willing to accept blood money or compensation (diya)
for lost body parts and organs.
Iran is not the only
Islamic country practicing spurious punishment. On April 21, 2005,
in Spingul, a valley near Faizabad in Afghanistan's Badakhshan
province, family members and villagers executed 25-year-old Bibi
Amin after she was found in the company of a man to whom she was not
married. She was buried to her neck and, for two hours, stoned.
There have been similar cases in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Somalia,
Pakistan, Nigeria, and other Muslim countries. Even in Egypt, where
Shari‘a law has been modified, men and women are still imprisoned
unequally for adultery.That the application of such punishments is
widespread and that its perpetrators justify their actions in Islam
neither means that a consensus exists among theologians or that such
interpretations have been consistent through time.
Qur'anic Attitudes toward Punishment
With only one exception, every chapter of the
Qur'an begins with the words Bismillah ar-rahman ar-rahim,
"In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate." While such
compassion is lacking in modern application of Shari‘a law, this has
not always been the case. Many traditional sources argue for limited
punishment. The Sunan of Ibn Maja, one of the six canonical
collections, cites a saying by Muhammad that reads, "Do not carry
out punishments if you can find a way to avoid them."
This example is echoed by
another tradition from the Sunan of Tirmidhi: "Wherever
possible, do not inflict punishments (hudud; singular hadd)
on Muslims; if there is a way out for someone, let him go. It is
better for the ruler (al-imam) to err in forgiveness than for
him to err in punishment."According to the twelfth-century jurist
and philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes), "hadd punishments are
suspended in doubtful cases," echoing another hadith to that
effect.
Still, in traditional
Islam, adultery and fornication (both termed zina') are
considered criminal acts worthy of a hadd punishment, which
the Qur'an sets at 100 lashes. Adultery
itself is a difficult charge to bring under Shari‘a: it requires
four adult male witnesses to the penetration; in contrast, only two
males (or four females) need witness murder for the charges to
stick. Nor is circumstantial evidence sufficient. Pregnancy is not
enough to prove that adultery occurred since the law considers that
a woman may have been penetrated in her sleep or, according to some
scholars, the possibility that an embryo could have gestated for up
to five years. The penalty for false accusation of adultery is
seventy-five lashes.
That does not mean that
Islamic law does not embrace the death penalty for adultery. At some
point—often said to have occurred during the rule of the second
caliph ‘Umar (r. 634-44)—jurists began to set the punishment for
married people as stoning to death based on a verse that had
allegedly been dropped from the Qur'an. Stoning is also mentioned in
the Hadith, and there is no doubt that Muhammad sanctioned the
punishment. However, strict conditions are determined for accusation
and punishment. A distinction is made between unmarried and married
offenders; inebriation, force, and errors such as intercourse with a
woman mistaken for a man's wife or slave girl are mitigating factors
while the demand for four eyewitnesses to sexual penetration makes
it almost impossible to bring an accusation. It is because of the
difficulties of formal adultery charges that many Islamic societies
embrace honor killing.
Historically, there were
significant differences in the treatment of free men and slaves.
Modern Iranian law discriminates even further against religious
minorities. The Islamic Republic might execute a non-Muslim man
accused of having sexual relations with a Muslim woman, whereas a
Muslim man who has sex with a non-Muslim woman is not subject to any
penalty.
Despite the potential for
leniency in the application of Islamic rules, states acting in the
name of religion have applied harsher penalties than traditional
religious jurists. The Islamic Republic of Iran ordered Ateqeh
Rajabi hanged even though Shari‘a only permits the execution of
married adulterers, whereas she was single. At most, she should have
received 100 lashes—and, according to many interpretations, these
should not be laid on hard.
The hadith
literature is not silent on two of the factors relevant to many of
the recent applications of capital punishment in the name of Islam
for crimes of honor. Tirmidhi relates an incident when a woman was
brought to the Prophet, accused of adultery. It transpired that the
man had forced her to have intercourse in acknowledgment of which
Muhammad refused to have her punished. Young age can also be cause
for leniency. Ibn Maja records a statement by a boy who survived the
massacre of the Jewish tribe of Banu Qurayza in 627, saying he had
been spared the fate of the tribe's men because he had not yet grown
pubic hair.
What about a case such as
Nazanin's, in which a person was killed? In Islamic law, offenses
against the person come under the law of qisas. These
offenses amount to five crimes: murder, voluntary manslaughter—such
as when an offender sets out to beat a victim but kills him or her
in the process, involuntary killing, intentional physical injury,
and unintentional injury.
Retaliation—a life for a
life—is permissible in the two instances of intentional killing or
injury, but even in these cases, the victim's family may waive
retribution in return for a set financial payment. In all other
cases, only blood money may be demanded. If correct Shari‘a rules
were applied, Nazanin would not face a death sentence for an
involuntary killing, especially when she had acted in defense of her
honor.
Theological Impediments to Reform
So why is there a growing discrepancy between
the penalties justified in Islamic jurisprudence and the far more
serious punishments applied? Traditional Muslims believe that the
Qur'an is immutable. It is not just a sacred text like the Torah or
the New Testament but a direct copy of God's word imprinted on the
mind of Muhammad via recitation from the Archangel Gabriel. It
cannot be rewritten. Indeed, a hadith attributes to Muhammad
the saying, "Whosoever disputes a single verse of the Qur'an, strike
off his head."
This doctrine has become
pernicious for all who attempt a modern understanding of the
scripture. Whereas progressive Jewish and Christian scholars and
clerics have devised forms of higher criticism that tackle issues of
context and period, all efforts to do the same thing with the Qur'an
have met with fierce resistance. Several Muslim reformers—notably
Pakistani academic Fazlur Rahman (1911-88), Iranian cleric Muhammad
Mujtahid-i Shabestari (b. 1936), Iranian philosopher ‘Abd al-Karim
Soroush (b. 1945), and the Syrian Muhammad Shahrur (b. 1938)—have
tried to develop ways to account for the social, linguistic, and
religious environment at the time of the Qur'an's revelation when
adjudicating and legislating on matters relevant to the modern
world, such as women's rights. Their efforts have pushed the debate
in a positive direction, but they are both better understood and
better liked in the West than in the Muslim world.
Muslim reactions to such
reformist initiatives have been largely hostile and even violent. In
the 1960s, a Pakistani religious court sentenced Fazlur Rahman to
death. Vigilantes have attacked Souroush on numerous occasions, and
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the Somali-born ex-member of the Dutch parliament;
Canadian writer Irshad Manji; and Los Angeles-based psychologist
Wafa Sultan, all outspoken critics of Islamic social practice,
are in hiding or under guard.
The pressure to reject
contextualization of the Qur'an is illustrated by two cases,
occurring more than sixty years apart in Egypt. In 1930, a cleric
named Muhammad Abu Zayd, published a book of Qur'an exegesis titled
Al-Hidaya wa'l-'Irfan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an bi'l-Qur'an, in which
he treated concepts such as paradise as metaphors. Other clerics at
Cairo's Al-Azhar University, the central seat of religious learning
and authority in Sunni Islam, condemned him. Rashid Rida' issued a
more forceful condemnation, accused the author of being an apostate,
and called for his forcible divorce. All copies of the tafsir
were collected by the police and destroyed. Clerics who had read it
were dismissed from their posts.
In 1992, history repeated
itself. Egyptian academic Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd presented research in
application for a full professorship at Cairo University. His work
argued that the Qur'an had been written in a human language so that
men could understand it. Since it was in a specific language, he
argued, it was legitimate to read it with reference to our knowledge
of seventh-century Arabic and the human world to which it was
directed. His arguments created an uproar. Al-Azhar University
condemned him. Leaflets and the popular press accused him of heresy.
The Egyptian government tried him before a secular court on charges
of apostasy. He was declared a heretic (mulhid) and an
apostate (murtadd) and became the object of death threats
from radical Islamists throughout the country. An Egyptian court
ordered that he and his wife be divorced on the grounds that a
Muslim woman cannot be married to a non-Muslim, even as he denied
ever abandoning his faith. He now teaches at the University of
Leiden in the Netherlands. That parallel situations would occur
sixty years apart illustrates how stifled scholarly discourse is at
Al-Azhar.
A particularly flagrant
example of academic suppression in a modern Shi‘ite context may be
seen in the case of ‘Abdulaziz Sachedina, a prominent Shi‘ite
academic, professor of religious studies at the University of
Virginia, and coauthor of Human Rights and the Conflict of
Cultures: Western and Islamic Perspectives on Religious Liberty.
In August 1998, Sachedina, who had received complaints from his
local Muslim community about his teaching and writing about Islam,
held a meeting in Najaf, Iraq, with grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. In
the course of this interview, as recorded in detail by Sachedina,
Sistani demanded that he could no longer "express any opinions in
matters dealing with Islam, its religion, and its teachings."
Prominent among the many theological errors of which Sachedina was
accused was his promotion of an irenic, pluralist approach to
Judaism and Christianity, which he saw as equals of Islam.
The net result of such
incidents is discouragement of serious revisionist work on the
Qur'an and the Hadith. Fear for one's life, the safety of one's
family, or one's livelihood are powerful disincentives to saying or
writing anything controversial. The only arena in which open debate
on such matters takes place is in Western academe, but it is likely
here that some Muslim academics living in the West and, indeed, some
Western scholars of Islam have chosen safer areas in which to carry
out research, knowing the risks they now run from a single
accusation of defamation.
Qur'anic Challenges
The problem is that, despite the belief that
the Qur'an is the immutable word of God, in its current form the
book was compiled only during the reign of the Caliph ‘Uthman
(644-56) and organized into suras, ranging in length from a few
verses to many pages. While the Qur'an was revealed over a period of
twenty-two years, the order of compilation was curious: with the
exception of the first sura (al-Fatiha), the longest suras
come first and the shortest last. Early scholars debated when
particular suras, verses, or groups of verses were "sent down."
Determining chronology was often basic, all suras being labeled
either Meccan or Medinan, based on in which of these two Arabian
cities Muhammad had received a particular revelation. Sometimes it
was possible to attribute certain passages to a particular incident,
such as the Battle of Uhud or a dispute with the Prophet's wives.
These asbab an-nuzul (occasions of revelation), insofar as
they are reliable, permit a more nuanced picture of how the text
developed during Muhammad's lifetime.
One thing is clear: later
verses often express a position contrary to earlier ones. For
example, early—mainly Meccan—verses express a positive view of Jews
and Christians, whereas late ones—all Medinan—follow the souring of
relations between the Prophet and both Jews and Christians. By this
reckoning, there are late verses that abrogate (termed nasikh)
and early verses which are abrogated (termed mansukh).
Verses commanding jihad
against non-believers abrogate those of an ecumenical nature, moving
from a position of "There is no compulsion in religion"
to "Fight those who do not believe in God or the last day, who do
not forbid what God and his Prophet forbid, who do not believe in
the religion of truth among those who were given the Book [Jews and
Christians] until they pay the poll tax (jizya) by their own
hands, having been brought low."
The problem is that earlier
sections of the Qur'an tend to be more amenable to a modernist
interpretation than later ones. Where modern Muslims emphasize the
verse decreeing that there is no compulsion in matters of faith,
more radical or orthodox scholars trump such citations with
nasikh verses overriding moderate interpretations.
What impact does this have
on punishment? Qur'anic verses that mention punishments are
invariably late but not very detailed. Although the Qur'an always
carries greater weight than the hadiths, it is not uncommon
to see a hadith cited to support a harsher legal position.
Thus, the verse, "There is no compulsion in religion" is outweighed
by the tradition according to which the Prophet said, "Whosoever
changes his religion, kill him," which forms a basis for the law of
apostasy as it still stands.
The
Emergence of Islamic Neo-radicalism
What happened to some strains of Islam to
favor the past over the present and glorify black-and-white
interpretations of the Qur'an over more nuanced approaches? While
the exact answer varies across regions, certain common factors
emerge.
In several cases, a puritan
form of Islam has either allied itself with a military or political
force—for example the Salafi-Wahhabi movement's alliance with the
Saud family in Saudi Arabia—or has itself taken political power, as
with the early nineteenth-century Sokoto Caliphate in West Africa
or, more recently, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's followers in Iran,
the Taliban in Afghanistan, or, perhaps, the Islamic Courts Union in
Somalia. In all such cases, the resulting political systems have
applied Shari‘a in a harsher form than usual.
In addition, from the
mid-nineteenth century to the present, there has been a broader
struggle between traditionalist and modernizing influences and
movements. Growing European influence in Middle Eastern states led
to demands for the introduction of Western-style constitutions,
educational systems, and laws. Many regional countries adopted
modern legal codes modeled on the French, Italian, Swiss, British,
or other systems. This represented a great step forward in respect
to areas such as family law, tangential women's rights, legal
clarity, and modes of punishment.
There were, however, two
drawbacks to this brand of modernization. The first was the
alienation of the clerical class. Religious leaders are "the
learned" (ulema), men who have undergone training as jurists within
Shari‘a. Marginalized by the introduction of European criminal codes
and the establishment of Western-style courts, divested in many
places of their role as educators, and alienated by the overt
secularization of many Muslim societies and cultures, the ulema
dreamed of a return to basics. They were backed by like-minded lay
thinkers, such as Hasan al-Banna (1906-49), a schoolteacher who
founded the Muslim Brotherhood, an influential and radicalizing
force in several countries in the Middle East and Europe.
The reaction against
modernization might have been muted had there been a loose movement
for reformation of Shari‘a itself. Mainstream scholars held that it
was impossible for modern jurists to challenge or alter the legal
precepts set down in the early tenth century by the four main Sunni
law schools—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali. The classical
formulation of this precept is that the gates of ijtihad,
independent reasoning in matters of religious law, had been closed.
The Qur'an—as the immutable word of God—could not be rewritten nor
could the records of the Prophet's life and sayings—the other source
from which Islamic law derived—be edited or reconsidered.
However, beginning in the
late nineteenth century, a number of thinkers argued that, even if
the sacred texts could not be altered, it was legitimate to exercise
reasoning in order to bring the laws more in line with modern ways
of thought and practice. At that time, Muslim attitudes to the West
were generally positive. Arab, Iranian, and Turkish political
reformers sought to emulate European political systems, science,
technology, military know-how, schools, universities, and laws. They
argued that Islam could advance by re-configuring itself along
Western lines.
Despite this, a small
number of intellectuals developed a countervailing trend that
emphasized the religious and legal thought of the first three
generations of the faith. This became the Salafi movement, derived
from the Arabic term salaf (predecessors).
Salafi thinkers such as Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905)[33]
reexamined the two basic texts, the Qur'an and the body of
traditions or hadiths that make up the Sunna, the
living record of how the Prophet and his companions behaved and
thought. From this emerged a belief that, far from needing to be
modernized, Islamic law and, by extension, Muslim life in general,
had to return to how it was at the time of the Salaf. Most of the
movements Western commentators term "fundamentalist" are Salafi.
While the first modern
Salafi thinkers sought reform, later Salafi theoreticians narrowed
the debate. Egyptian cleric Muhammad Rashid Rida' (1865-1935)
published a periodical, Al-Manar (The Lighthouse),
which influenced intellectuals across the Islamic world. His ideas
formed a bridge between Salafi reformers and more radical movements
such as Banna's Muslim Brotherhood.
These new Salafists focused
on improving Muslim morals and what has come to be known as "Shari‘a-mindedness."
Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), probably the
most influential Islamist thinker of the twentieth century, took
this moral emphasis and extended it to include violent action
against both non-believers and unfaithful Muslim rulers. He argued
that the term al-jahiliya, which had normally been used to
define the "Age of Ignorance" that preceded Islam, should now be
applied to the present day to the extent that modern
society—including Muslim society—had distanced itself from Islam.
Just as Muhammad fought a holy war against the forces of paganism in
seventh-century Arabia, so, too, true Muslims should fight the
barbarism of the modern age. Qutb outlined these ideas in a short
book, Ma'alim fi' t-Tariq (Milestones on the Road),
based on notes he kept in prison. The text launched the new,
radicalized, jihadist style of Salafi thought and activism.
It is this world-view that
is echoed today by theorists such as Osama bin Laden and groups such
as the Afghan Taliban. They argue that Islam cannot adapt to the
changes imposed by history but must remain rigidly faithful to the
existing interpretations of scripture, the models laid down by the
Prophet and his companions, and the legal rulings developed from
these sources by the first generations of legal scholars.
Reform without Reformation
There have been and are a number of reformers
working to bring Islam into closer harmony with universal standards
of justice, tolerance, pluralism, and human rights. These include
Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005), the founder of a school of Islamic
neo-modernism in Indonesia, in which contextualized, independent
reasoning in matters of religious law, ijtihad, is put
forward as a path to renovation, and radicalism is understood as an
obstacle to progress because of its authoritarian and intolerant
nature; Mohammed Arkoun, an Algerian thinker, who teaches at the
University of Paris III, for whom secularization and modernization
are essential elements of Islamic progress; and feminists such as
Asra Q. Nomani who have called for major liberalization in the
sphere of women's rights.
Others present a
liberalizing face to the Western media and academia but retain an
essentially conservative position on everything from hijab
(veiling) to jihad. This charismatic but, essentially, two-faced
trend promotes an image of Islam as protective of human rights while
sticking to an agenda in favor of strict Shari‘a limitations to such
rights. Two notable figures in this context are Tariq Ramadan and
Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Ramadan is the Swiss-born grandson of
Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna. With a broad academic
background including Swiss doctorates in philosophy and Islamic
studies, and Arabic and Islamic studies qualifications from Al-Azhar
University, he has taught at several Western universities, including
the University of Fribourg and St. Anthony's College, Oxford. While
he is banned from the United States, he has been accepted in Europe
as a Muslim intellectual with a reputation for moderation. That
said, many French intellectuals describe him as "The Master of
Doubletalk" and regard him as an intégriste or
fundamentalist. He has argued, for example, that Muslims should
enter into mainstream society only to move it closer to Islam; that
he accepts Western laws but only so long as they do not oblige him
to do something against his religion; that stoning for adultery
should be subject only to a moratorium until Muslim clerics discuss
the matter; that Muslim women should insist on wearing the veil;
that swimming pools should be segregated, and so on. His support for
radicals such as Yahya Michot, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, or Sayyid Qutb
lays bare an agenda far from that of the moderate he likes to pass
himself off to be.
Qaradawi (b. 1926) is
another Azharite with an international following. Considered by most
Muslims as a "moderate conservative" and lionized by London mayor
Ken Livingstone, Qaradawi's moderation on issues such as elections
and women's enfranchisement is a thin disguise for radicalism. He
has issued fatwas and commented in lectures, television
broadcasts, and on the Internet that wives should submit to their
husbands; men may beat their wives "lightly;" men and women should
mix only to a very limited degree; and women must wear hijab.
He has deemed female genital mutilation, flogging of adulterers, and
execution of homosexuals and apostates permissible and has endorsed
suicide attacks against Israeli civilians or U.S. soldiers and
civilians in Iraq. He has also condemned liberal democracies and
urged Muslims to vent their anger publicly on issues such as the
Danish cartoon controversy.
Some Western governments
have relied upon Ramadan, Qaradawi, and others to develop
appropriate policies towards Islam and Muslims. Western media have
painted them as authorities on Islam, enabling them to speak without
an explicit mandate on behalf of Muslims. By drawing media and
government attention to themselves while keeping their agendas
hidden, they come to overshadow more authentically reformist
figures. This problem is compounded by the numerous self-appointed
bodies claiming to represent Muslims in Western countries, such as
the Council for American-Islamic Relations and the Muslim Council of
Britain.
None of these individuals
have used their prominence to speak out about harsh punishments, the
execution of minors, or the stoning of those whom most modern
cultures would call innocent women. It is probable that many
self-described reformers practice a form of taqiya or
religious dissimulation in order to show a moderate face to the West
and quite a different perspective to their constituents in the
Muslim world.
Indeed, when challenged
about the harshness of Shari‘a penalties, many Muslim writers and
Islamist politicians state their dislike for the alternative—human
rights as defined by the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights"—on
the grounds that such agreements are of Western origin, that they
will undermine the norms of Islamic societies, and that they are not
themselves based on Shari‘a rulings. Some Muslim intellectuals have
even argued that human rights do not exist in Islam. In 1985, Sa'id
Raja'i-Khurasani, the permanent Iranian delegate to the United
Nations, stated that the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which represented secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian
tradition, could not be implemented by Muslims and did not accord
with the system of values recognized by the Islamic Republic of Iran
… his country would, therefore, not hesitate to violate its
prescriptions." According to Ayatollah
Muhammad-Taqi Misbah-Yazdi, a contender for the role of Iranian
supreme leader upon the demise or removal of ‘Ali Khamene'i,
"Islamic human rights differ from the ‘Declaration of Human Rights.'
… Human rights must be Islamic human rights."
Conclusion
There are, then, several reasons why severe
punishments and unreasonable judgments continue in parts of the
Islamic world and why certain human rights—the freedom to change
one's religion, to convert Muslims to another faith, to enjoy full
civil rights as a Baha'i, Zoroastrian, Armenian, or Jew, to marry by
free choice, to write about controversial religious issues—are
nowhere recognized. In the absence of fully secularized educational
systems and with the increasing political involvement of groups such
as the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas, the day when genuine reform
arrives in most Muslim countries seems to be as far off as ever.
A hardening of sentiment
against the West and an increasing tendency to fall back on
conspiracy theories to explain Islamic problems seem to make
insistence on tough Shari‘a -mindedness a desirable option for many
if only as a weapon to use against perceived Western weaknesses.
Desperate not to offend, the West has done little to make issue of
abuses such as those promoted by judges like Haji Reza'i. While
crimes such as his go unpunished, the continued stoning, hanging,
flogging, and even beheading all serve to intimidate Western critics
and are, therefore, encouraged by Islamic states and groups.
On a wider scale, a major
debate needs to take place between advocates of Islamic or other
relativist human rights agendas and supporters of the principle that
such rights are, by their very nature, universal and applicable to
all people at all times and in all places. Unfortunately, that
debate cannot take place openly while there is a threat of violence
from those who oppose the notion of human rights as a Western or
Zionist evil.
What are the policy
implications of this situation for Western countries, the U.N., and
international human rights organizations? One is that they should
give more genuine support to Muslim reformers, their conferences and
publications, and, where appropriate, their teaching positions.
Another is to pressure Islamic governments to make arrests when
death threats and similar menaces are used instead of open argument.
A recent Saudi doctoral thesis listed two hundred names of
intellectuals who must be killed while, in May 2006, Osama bin Laden
declared open season on all Muslim freethinkers. Neither the Saudi
government nor the Islamic establishment elsewhere have moved to
counter such provocations.
Human rights issues must be
linked more firmly to trade and other agreements. The
multiculturalist notion that Muslims may not be criticized for the
use of unjust and cruel punishments must be countered. The stigma of
political incorrectness is counterproductive. Islamic countries and
ordinary Muslims must be given incentives to observe human rights
norms within their borders and disincentives to apply the Shari‘a in
harsh and unjust ways.
The case of Egyptian
democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim is instructive and suggests
that outside pressure can work. In 2000, following his criticism of
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's anointing of son Gamal as his
successor, an Egyptian court arrested Ibrahim on spurious charges
involving finance of his nongovernmental organization, the Ibn
Khaldun Center for Development Studies. The Bush administration
responded by withholding nearly $200 million in aid pending
Ibrahim's release. The Egyptian government responded by setting him
free.
The payoff from support
given to positive reform is potentially enormous. If genuinely
reformist thinkers are enabled to have an impact within Muslim
societies, violence, unjust punishments, and abuse of human rights
in the name of religion will decline. In the end, a space for
dialogue can only be opened up when intellectual debate joins forces
with a determined war on terror—not only terror against Western
interests but also against all violence done to Muslims themselves
in the name of religion.
Denis MacEoin holds a Ph.D. in Persian studies from the
University of Cambridge. He taught Arabic and Islamic Studies at
Newcastle University and was for many years an honorary fellow
at Durham University. He is currently the Royal Literary Fund
Fellow at Newcastle University.
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