US-Iran Relations: Perils
and Promises
By
Hooshang
Amirahmadi
For over a quarter of century, the US and Iran have been hostile towards
each other. The problem began with the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran
and the subsequent taking of American hostages in Tehran. Even before
the Revolution, many Iranians were bitter toward the US for helping the
British to overthrow their democratically elected Prime Minster Mohammad
Mosadeq in 1953, and to support Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the dictator
whom the Revolution overthrew. The bitterness that ensued turned into a
fierce anti-Americanism during the Revolution and precipitated the
storming of the American Embassy in Tehran by young Islamic radicals.
Although the hostages were released unharmed after 444 days in
captivity, this episode has created a negative ripple effect that
continues today. From two friends and partners, the US and Iran have
become two enemies, harming and demonizing each other ever since.
Currently, two “ultra” conservative governments in Washington and Tehran
face each other. Will the “extremes meet”? Only time can tell but
evidence suggests that this hostility will continue unabated, and Iran’s
nuclear program is providing the pretext. After Iran’s negotiations with
the EU Trio (Britain, France and Germany) collapsed in 2004, and the US
and its European allies convinced the Board of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) on September 19, 2005, that it should report Iran
to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions to stop its nuclear
enrichment activities. Meanwhile, Russia and China, while maintaining
serious reservations about sanctions against Iran, have joined the US-EU
alliance in demanding that Tehran suspend uranium enrichment program as
a precondition for a negotiated settlement of the nuclear crisis. The
so-called 5+1 group (the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council plus Germany) has invoked the Chapter Seven of the UN Charter
that would authorize the use of force if Iran were to defy the demand.
The basis for such an action would be Iran’s concealment of its nuclear
activities in the past and the lack of adequate transparency about its
current intentions and activities. Both at the IAEA and at the Council,
the US faces serious obstacles towards its attempts to punish Iran.
Nonetheless, it is probable that the US and its allies will ultimately
succeed in isolating and eventually confronting Iran unless Tehran
abandons its enrichment program according to their schedule.
The latest chance for the opening of a new dialogue, provided by
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to the US to participate at the UN
sessions in September 2005 was unwisely lost. Indeed, the speeches by
the two presidents, while avoiding name-calling or direct threats, did
not offer any hope that the situation would improve any time soon. Mr.
Ahmadinejad warned against “unilateralism” and “pre-emptive” actions
against other nations (presumably Iran), and Mr. Bush reiterated his now
famous line that: “the rulers of the outlaw regimes …will not be allowed
to threaten the peace and stability of the world.” In subsequent months,
Mr. Ahmadinejad has followed a contradictory and unsuccessful approach
that has included increased hostility toward Israel and offer of
dialogue with the US (he called Holocaust a myth and said that Israel
should be wiped off the map at the same time that he wrote a letter to
Mr. Bush and asked for a debate with him). The only positive American
overture has been an offer of indirect talks on the condition that Iran
agree to suspend its uranium enrichment programs. Yet, as we shall argue
below, both sides have no better option than to engage in an honest
dialogue toward the normalization of relations. It is unfortunate that
no state or international organization, including the UN, established to
further peace and friendship among nations, feels obliged to mediate a
rapprochement between Iran and the United States.
Perspectives and
Options for the US
Secretary George Shultz in a private conversation with this author at
his home on the Stanford University campus in summer of 2001 summarized
the American view of Iran since the Revolution in four points. First,
that Iran is a very important country; we should have never lost its
partnership and now that we have, we need to regain it. Second, that no
regime has harmed the US more than the Islamic Republic of Iran, and
that it is going to be difficult, if not impossible, to mend relations
with this regime. Third, that we understand that the Iranian religious
leadership would change its behavior in areas of nuclear technology,
terrorism, and Middle East peace if subjected to American military
force, but that is not an option that we could entertain unless no other
options were left. Finally, that there is only one mutually beneficial
solution to our problem, to begin a dialogue that will help normalize
relations, and that this dialogue has to begin with building confidence
at the highest level.
Secretary Shultz made these remarks immediately before the September 11
tragedy. Since then the world has changed, particularly in the Middle
East, and so have US-Iran relations. The American military has destroyed
a terrorist regime in Afghanistan and a dictatorship in Iraq wrongfully
alleged to have weapons of mass destruction and links with terrorist
groups. Both countries remain politically unsettled and economically in
shambles. Yet, after the successful elections there, the Bush
administration has been able to absolve itself, at least partially, of
its responsibility for this situation, and has increasing paid attention
to Iran. American forces are now stationed at a stone’s throw from
Iran’s forces. Meanwhile, Washington has been threatening Iran with
additional sanctions and the use of force, and according to certain
reports, a small contingent of American intelligence forces might have
already entered Iran. Iran’s presidential elections in June of 2005,
which produced an ultra-conservative religious administration, and the
deadlock in negotiations over Iran’s enrichment programs have in the
meantime convinced Washington that it should adopt a more explicit
regime change policy (see my article, “In
the Name of the Iranian People - Regime Change or Regime Reform?”
at
http://www.american-iranian.org/pubs/articles/IntheNameoftheIranianPeople-03-22-06.pdf).
While the Bush Administration has been struggling with a new Iran
policy, a few think tanks and pressure groups have offered their
recommendations. The Council on Foreign Relations has recommended that
the US “selectively engage” Iran to address critical US concerns and
broaden linkages between the Iranian population and the outside world.
The Committee on Present Dangers has suggested that the US adopt a
policy of engagement and regime change by opening a dialogue with
Tehran, supporting the Iranian people, and simultaneously convincing the
Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei to relinquish power. The Iran Policy
Committee has recommended that the US consider a combination of coercive
diplomacy, destabilization by the MEK, and limited military operations
to facilitate regime change. The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy has recommended that the US work with the EU Trio on the nuclear
matter but keep the option of surgical military strikes open, and
simultaneously assist the opposition. Finally, the International Crisis
Group has put force the idea of a “grand bargain” with Iran, whereby the
two countries agree to settle all outstanding disputes at once.
The American Iranian Council (AIC), a research and policy institute
devoted to improving understanding and dialogue between the two
countries, has recommended that the US and Iran undertake a number of
“confidence-building measures” as a prelude to negotiations for
establishing diplomatic ties without preconditions, except for the
conditions of genuinely free elections in the future, protection of
human rights, and the role of law in Iran. They then should work
judiciously toward resolving issues of mutual concern focusing on the
more easily resolved issues and on common interests. For the process to
move forward, both sides have to be sincere in their pursuit of a normal
relationship and realistically address the key domestic and regional
challenges their negotiations will face. In AIC’s view, the policy
recommendations offered by the think tanks and ad hoc committees
mentioned above are unrealistic and thus unpractical. They are based on
a mistaken view of Iran and the regime, propose options for the US while
ignoring the Iranian side, and reflect the views of a select group of
foreign policy technocrats while excluding input from the general public
and other key participants.
The Iranian Challenge
Iran poses the most daunting foreign policy challenge for the Bush
Administration. The President has said he is determined to halt Iran’s
nuclear ambitions, support for terrorism, and opposition to a peace
settlement in the Middle East. He has also assured the Iranian people
that the US is on their side as they seek liberty and freedom from the
Islamic theocracy. These pronouncements are indicative of two American
concerns: that the Islamic regime will not implode any time soon as some
have predicted and Washington has hoped, and that its military-strategic
power is growing while it remains an Islamic theocracy unfriendly to the
US. Implied in the President’s words is also the fact that American
concern has shifted from Tehran’s behavior to the regime itself. In the
wake of the June 2005 presidential elections in Iran, this policy shift
was solidly pursued by the US, leading to a policy of regime change with
a minor proviso for regime reform.
The American concern about Iran’s power and its theocracy, namely the
Iranian regime, is understandable. The Islamic Republic of Iran is
hostile to the US and its protégé, Israel, and it is building closer
relations with America’s future rivals for global leadership,
particularly China, the Russian Federation, and India. From an American
perspective, this easterly strategic orientation is not an acceptable
position or ideology for Iran to assume in international relations given
that Tehran can and intends to build nuclear bombs (even give them to
Islamic terrorists), has huge oil and gas reserves, and benefits from a
significant geo-political environment. Thus, Iran must understand that
the US’ problem with it is larger than the sum of American concerns with
Tehran’s behavior. This larger challenge is what Iran needs to address
if it were to normalize relations with the US.
From an American perspective, the problem with Iran’s power and position
can be addressed in three ways: either by developing a partnership with
that power, reducing it to a non-threatening size, or by changing the
regime. It appears that the Bush Administration sees no chance of
building a partnership with the regime, largely because of its animosity
toward Israel and its theocratic state system, whose legitimacy the US
has yet to recognize. That leaves the power reduction or regime change
as the only two options. Thus, the immediate challenge facing the US is
to prevent Iran from going nuclear. However, the nuclear issue, while
important in itself, is also a pretext for the US to enter into a wider
confrontation with Iran. Tehran is rightly convinced that the US
ultimately wants to change the Islamic regime, and with that pretext in
mind, it is hesitant to give up its nuclear programs.
Tehran certainly considers its nuclear programs as a prestigious and
scientific undertaking as well as a future defensive shield against
foreign threat, considering the markedly different ways in which America
has treated Iraq and North Korea. While such thinking on the part of
Tehran, given its theocratic regime, should concern the US and Israel,
among others, the threat posed by Iran is surely overblown in comparison
to other nuclear threats that are being ignored or relegated to a lesser
status. The major nuclear states continue to amass their stockpiles of
nuclear bombs, and massive amount of nuclear materials remain
unprotected and unaccounted within the former states of the USSR.
Meanwhile, India, Pakistan and Israel remain outside the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and continue to build up their nuclear
arsenal with complete lack of transparency. In our dynamic world,
friends and enemies do not always remain the same. Today’s friend could
be tomorrow’s enemy and vice-versa.
The view of Iran as a nuclear threat also ignores history and fact.
Specifically, the nuclear state with closest link to terrorism is
Pakistan, not Iran; even if Iran were to successfully develop a “second
strike” nuclear capability, it would only use it defensively. In the
last two hundred years or so, Iran has not initiated a single regional
conflict. The only state toward which Iran remains hostile is Israel
but, as the history demonstrates, much of the anger Iran directs toward
Israel is rhetorical, some in response to Israeli rhetoric and others
initiated by Tehran for domestic consumption. True, Iran is an
authoritarian state but when was the last time an undemocratic state
used a nuclear bomb against another state? The fear of regime collapse
or change, even if that were to occur in Iran in the foreseeable future,
and the consequent danger of nuclear materials falling into the wrong
hands, is also overblown. Notably, regime collapse or change in the
former USSR and in Pakistan has not led to nuclear disasters.
While prestige, science and defense are critical factors in Iran’s
decision to go nuclear, the country also needs to develop an alternative
energy source despite its huge oil and gas reserves. Given Iran’s
climate and natural resources, nuclear energy may indeed be the best
possible alternative. The argument that Iran does not need nuclear
energy because of its huge oil and gas reserves is contrary to the
findings of many Iran energy watchers. Most of Iran’s natural gas is
used for heating and gasification of the obsolete oil wells. Iranian oil
is also consumed at a rate far above its production growth rate, leaving
increasingly less crude oil for export. By 2025, Iran’s population will
surpass 100 million. Unless energy prices in Iran rise to the
international level, a politically suicidal move for any regime, Iran
could indeed become a net importer of oil products. Meanwhile, US
sanctions have crippled Iran’s ability to increase oil production at an
appropriate rate. Oil export accounts for over 80 percent of Iran’s
foreign exchange earnings and Iran has an increasingly larger bill to
pay for its required imports, including food and gasoline.
EU Dependency and US
Public Diplomacy
The fact that Iran’s nuclear issue is primarily used as a pretext by the
Bush Administration to widen its conflict with the Islamic regime is
also reflected in Washington’s approach to the nuclear negotiations
between Iran and the EU Trio. It should surprise no one that the
Administration did not want to join the negotiations until the Europeans
accepted the American position that Iran permanently halts uranium
enrichment, a demand which the US anticipates Tehran would not accept
unless forced. This was, indeed, what the Europeans told President Bush
and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice when they met their counterparts
in Europe in the beginning of the negotiations between the Trio and
Tehran in late 2003. The Trio told their American visitors that the
negotiations with Iran would fail even if the US were to join, because
Iran would not accept the EU-US condition. In that eventuality, the
blame would fall upon the US if it refused to join the negotiations;
otherwise, the Iranians would be blamed, in which case condemning Iran
before the UN Security Council would be easier.
In accepting the US conditions, the EU Trio has surprised and dismayed
Iran. According to sources in Tehran and New York, before the Foreign
Ministers of the EU Trio flew to Tehran to begin nuclear negotiations in
2003, the Iranian authorities told them that Iran had two conditions.
First, that the Trio would not ask Iran to forego uranium enrichment;
and second, that the Trio would support Iran in case the US wanted to
take it before the UN Security Council for “violating” the NPT. Both
conditions, I am told, were accepted based on Iran’s promise to come
clean about its nuclear programs. The Europeans even promised to help
establish a direct dialogue between Iran and the US. It was based on
this understanding that they signed the October 2004 agreement in
Tehran, whereby Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment,
resolve all questions about its nuclear
programs, and allow the IAEA to conduct surprise inspections of Iran’s
nuclear sites. Significantly,
President Bush welcomed the agreement as “a
very positive development.”
Those same sources also state that as former British Foreign Minister
Jack Straw boarded the plane for Tehran, former Secretary of State Colin
Powell called upon him to clarify the US position, namely that it would
not settle for anything less than a full and permanent halt to all
Iranian uranium enrichment activities. The week before the Trio left for
Iran, Prime Minster Tony Blair of the UK visited and consulted with
President Bush on the forthcoming negotiations with Iran and confirmed
that all American concerns would be addressed. The Americans knew that
the Europeans would eventually adopt the American position. The Iranian
negotiators should also have known that the EU was either unwilling or
incapable of handling a major international crisis independently of the
US. In recent years, they had both the Bosnian and the Iraqi crises for
reference. The EU dependence on the US when engaging in major
international crises has a foundation in their economic, political, and
military relations.
To cover up its dependent position, the EU now accuses Iran of
negotiating in bad faith. The IAEA disagrees, though it faults Iran for
the lack of transparency in intentions and certain information or
actions. The Agency has found no evidence that Iran is intending to
build nuclear bombs and is reluctant to declare Iran in violation of the
NPT. While Iran had concealed its enrichment programs prior to
negotiations with the Trio, it has since given detailed report of its
nuclear activities and has allowed full inspections of all its suspected
and declared sits. Iran has also signed the Agency’s Additional
Protocol for non-proliferation, allowing it unannounced site visits. Its
ratification by the Iranian Parliament was made a precondition to the
successful conclusion of Iran-EU negotiations.
The Bush administration’s decision to join the EU Trio in supporting
limited economic incentives for Iran to permanently halt uranium
enrichment was and is designed with two purposes in mind: first, to
change the spirit of the NPT without renegotiating it; and second, to
win a public relations coup against Iran that would allow for the use of
force if that were required. In 2002, President George W. Bush
suggested that “rogue” states should not be allowed to enrich uranium
even for peaceful purposes, although the NPT currently gives them that
right. That idea, which did not meet with the approval of the
non-Western members of the NPT during the UN 2005 Review Conference, was
subsequently implemented when the EU Trio reversed its position and
accepted the American argument against Iran, a signatory to the NPT.
The US’ public relations ploy to sway public opinion toward the US
position has been clearly articulated by President Bush and Secretary of
State Rice. Referring to the US-EU joint carrot-and-stick Iran strategy,
the Secretary of State told Reuters that, “This is about unifying the
international community so that it’s Iranians who are isolated, not the
United States.” And in President Bush’s words, as quoted in the New
York Times, “We are working with our friends to make sure not only
the world hears that but that the negotiating strategy achieves the
objective of pointing out where guilt needs to be, as well as achieving
the objective of no nuclear weapons.” The Bush administration has come
under extreme pressure from domestic and international sources to give
full diplomacy a chance before resorting to military means as a last
option.
Unrealistic US Options
Thus, when President Bush says “all options” remain open, he signals
that he is not contemplating serious diplomacy. The remaining options
include UN-sponsored sanctions, regime change or reform, and a war,
total or surgical, by the US or Israel. Multilateral sanctions, as the
first phase of a “planned” confrontation, can weaken Iran only if they
were to include embargos against Iranian oil for a protracted period.
The US can hardly convince Europe, Japan, or China to accept such
sanctions, as they all depend heavily on Iranian oil. Nor will Russia
want to sacrifice its lucrative business with Tehran, as it expects to
build several more nuclear plants for Iran. Besides, Iran has
significant foreign exchange reserves and is not as dependent on oil
today as it was in the past. Iran’s non-oil trade with the EU is
growing, and becoming increasingly more important than its oil trade
with the European bloc.
Surgical military operations, parallel with or subsequent to sanctions,
can inflict heavy damage on Iran. However, no matter how long they are
sustained, such attacks can hardly dismantle all of Iran’s nuclear or
military infrastructures, which are dispersed over its large and
complicated geography. Besides, if Iran were building nuclear bombs, it
certainly would be doing so in places as yet uncovered. Surgical strikes
would also increase domestic and international support for the regime,
particularly if the use of force were to occur before UN-sponsored
sanctions and diplomacy have been given an opportunity to succeed.
Surgical strikes would also make Iran leave the NPT and would strengthen
Tehran’s resolve to build bombs quickly, actions that the religious
right is currently advocating.
The futility of surgical strikes and UN-sponsored sanctions, if such
sanctions were possible, is obvious: They will not resolve the Iranian
power problem, will not lead to regime change, and will not help
Iranians build a democracy. They will surely inflict heavy damage upon
Iran, and increase regional tensions, as regional states and non-state
actors are forced to take sides. Iran can also be expected to respond to
any military attack, particularly if Israelis are involved, leading to
further regional instability. If the US were to find sanctions and
surgical strikes ineffective, it might adopt an explicit policy of
regime change, which the pro-war Iranian opposition in exile and the
American neoconservatives support.
Can the US change the Iranian regime? Three possible paths exist to
regime change in Iran: an internal military coup, a US military
invasion, and a takeover by the opposition. None of these approaches
will work in the current Iranian environment even if the US were to use
them in combination with sanctions and surgical strikes. The first is a
non-starter. Americans and the opposition groups have not been able to
cultivate trusted friends among the high ranks of the military, the
regime has established a tight grip over them after a few attempted
coups in the early 1980s, and the Iranian generals are not as popular
with the people and are less ambitious than their Pakistani and Turkish
counterparts.
An invasion of Iran, if it were to happen, would only occur as a follow
up to surgical strikes, is feasible and would reduce Iran’s military
power in the short term. The regime itself, however, would certainly
survive the invasion, even if it sustains enormous casualties. The
invasion would also impose unbearable costs and casualty upon the US.
The Islamic regime has over a million men and women under arms and can
mobilize another million easily. These forces include devoted Moslems
who are fiercely loyal to the regime. The Iranian territory is vast and
formidable, and the Iranian population is 70 million strong and is
generally nationalistic and patriotic. American forces can hardly march
into Tehran under such conditions, and as long as the regime controls
Tehran, it will last.
The American use of the Iranian pro-war opposition for an invasion would
not help either, as they are small in size and unpopular with the
Iranian people. Autonomy-seeking or separatist forces among the ethnic
communities (Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, and Azeris) are also weak, and most
regional states will not offer meaningful support to the US because they
befriend Iran or fear a possible retaliation from Iran. The
Administration should also not count upon the Iranian people to rise up
against the regime in the middle of a war waged against them. Save for a
small fraction, they dislike war and revolution and would unite in the
face of outside threats. Any American invasion would sure produce an
anti-American backlash among a potentially friendly Iranian population.
The regime would also unleash its Islamic supporters in the region
against the US and Israel. At home, it would most likely impose a
military government on the country and martial law in Tehran. The
younger generation, which has been moving away from radical Islam, could
be agitated using an Islamic or fascistic ideology and organized for war
actions with far-reaching regional consequences. The attack would also
strengthen the regime’s resolve to build nuclear bombs. As a result of
the security-military conditions, any reform or human rights movement
would be considered contrary to Iran’s national security and would be
forcefully crushed. The Iranian bombs would become a reality before an
Iranian democracy.
Alternatively, the US can also provide the exiled opposition with
material and logistical support to change the regime in Tehran. The
royalists, led by Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah, used to be
a favorite of the Fox News Channel and the Israeli lobby groups. Now
many in the neoconservative movement, and a recent Iran Policy
Committee, are lobbying to enlist the Iranian armed resistance group
nicknamed MEK to destabilize Tehran. This group, which is considered a
“terrorist group” by the US State Department’s own designation, was
formerly pro-Saddam and is now under American protection in Iraq. Some
members of Congress are also supporting a premature and impractical
proposal by certain exile groups for a national referendum to change the
Iranian constitution and, by extension, the regime. Still other
allegedly informed Iranian opposition figures have called for “smart
sanctions” against the leaders of the regime in the hope of forcing them
into compromise with the West over the nuclear issue and democratic
reforms.
For some time, the Bush administration has been assisting the exiled
opposition and its California television stations to destabilize Tehran.
Escalating such support will not make a qualitative difference in the
ability of the exiled opposition to change the regime or even its
constitution. They are small, divided, disorganized, without vision,
unpopular with the Iranian people, and unfamiliar with the domestic
political terrain. Worse yet, they are essentially middle class
intelligentsia focused on democracy, ignorant of the needs and
aspirations of the upper and lower class Iranians. Significantly, the
key domestic opposition groups and personalities do not support the
exiled opposition. They prefer a homegrown democracy to an American-led
regime change.
A Realistic US Option
Even though sanctions, surgical strikes, and the various other
approaches to regime change, alone or in combination, will not work, the
Islamic Republic has an incentive to accept a negotiated settlement with
the US and the Iranian people. Regime reform and normalization of
US-Iran relations are possible, and as I shall argue, they are the two
sides of the same movement. Tehran is under both internal and external
pressure, the regime is divided about its future direction, the reform
movement is strong among the greater population, and the Iranian people
both desire normal relations with the US and demand democratic change.
Two parallel movements can increase the chance for a negotiated
settlement: for the US to give the nuclear negotiations a real chance to
succeed, and for the regime to allow its opposition to unconditionally
participate in free and fair future elections.
Proponents of regime change, even those favoring reform, fear that a
change of US policy in favor of engagement would effectively represent
an American acceptance of the political status quo in Iran, prolonging
the regime’s life and destroying any hope for democracy. This is an
essentially anti-American argument. Those on the political right,
including the Royalists, the MEK, and other so-called pro-democracy
individuals, take an instrumental view of the US, and wish to use
American power to destroy the regime in Tehran just as certain exile
Iraqi opposition leaders used the US military to destroy Saddam Hossein
and his regime. These groups are friendly neither to American interests
nor to Iranian democracy, since they disregard the exorbitant price
Americans would have to pay for a military victory over Iran, and the
colossal cost the Iranians would incur if the US were to invade Iran.
Those
on the political left who oppose engagement or the normalization of
diplomatic relations have been making an anti-American argument of their
own, based upon the Stalinist dogma that “American imperialism” is
anti-democratic and pro-dictatorship. They point to past US support for
dictatorships, but fail to recognize the fact that in the post-Cold War
period, America has done more to undermine dictators than any other
world power or democratic state.
The experience of the
last 25 years also suggests that no nation has become democratic while
lacking diplomatic relations with the US. No anti-American model of
democracy can exist, for at least two reasons: first, such a model would
necessarily be antagonistic to the American philosophy that America
means democracy; and second, such anti-American regimes often use their
stance against the US to marginalize or completely destroy democratic
movements within their own countries.
While diplomatic ties with the US have often been a necessary condition
for the transition from a society controlled by a dictator to a
democracy, they are not sufficient on their own for this transition. Two
other factors have also been influential: economic interaction and
sustained pressure for democracy and human rights, or in President
Bush’s words, “freedom and liberty.” Since the late 1970s, in roughly 30
authoritarian regimes where these conditions were met, societies have
moved toward democracy. Examples include South Korea, Eastern Europe,
Russia and South Africa. In contrast, where these conditions were not
met, authoritarian regimes remained in power. Examples include Cuba and
North Korea, along, of course, with Iran, where broken diplomatic ties
with the US and economic sanctions have encouraged a drift towards
conservatism, making these countries “depots for the tyrants,” again
quoting the President.
Critics will point to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among other states, in
which these conditions have been met but in which the regimes remain
authoritarian. Ironically, most these countries are either Islamic,
oil-producing, or both. The truth is that the mixture of Islam, oil, and
an authoritarian political culture has proven to be an immense obstacle
to democratization. Reforming Islam to accept a democratic secular role,
diversifying oil-based economies to increase state dependency on the
population, and advancing a coalition-based political process are
necessary prerequisites to democratic regime reform. Ironically,
countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which have diplomatic ties with
the US, have a better chance to become democratic than Iran or North
Korea, which have minimal or no diplomatic relations with the US.
Internal collapse or the use of foreign force against these regimes is
of course possible, but neither of these options would guarantee a
democratic transition.
While
those focused against regime change or regime reform make essentially
anti-American arguments against US-Iran engagement, the more hawkish
anti-Iran groups take the view that such “appeasing” approaches would
leave Iran’s growing military power unchecked, thus endangering any
prospects for peace in the region region. The intellectual basis for the
sanctions against Tehran is the idea that a weaker Iran is a better
Iran. The ultimate result of the sanctions, however, has not only been a
weaker Iran but also a more aggressive and less democratic Iran. These
same hawks now advocate military attacks on Iran’s nuclear and military
installations. They argue that, in the absence of balancing regional
forces, the destruction of Iran’s power by the US is the only option to
check Iran’s regional ambitions. They conveniently ignore the nuclear
states around Iran while exaggerating the threat posed by a strong Iran.
As mentioned above, Iran has not initiated any regional conflicts over
the last two centuries or so even though it has been in large part ruled
by non-democratic regimes. Significantly, whenever Iran has been weaker,
the region surrounding it has been proportionately less stable. If the
1979 Revolution had not weakened Iran, Saddam Hossein would have not
invaded Iran in 1980, a war which then created a domino effect that
engulfed the region, the effects of which are still being felt. In
contrast, a stronger Iran has often acted as an anchor of regional
stability. A stronger, friendlier and more democratic Iran would surely
be preferable to a weaker, dictatorial and inimical Iran. This being the
case, then the US does not need to weaken Iran in order to make it a
more responsible country. Rather, it should normalize relations with
Tehran, help form a regional security system with Iran as a pivotal
member, and recognize that Iran’s power needs are proportionate to its
regional weight and national security requirements.
The
key concept is the normalization of relations: are they possible; would
they resolve US concerns about Iran’s power, and would they help the
democratization of Iran? My response to each of these questions is a
resolute yes. Iran and the US have no demands for one another that could
not be solved by negotiation, and their common interests far outweigh
their differences, as illustrated by the American wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. They also have a common interest in a stable Persian Gulf
and Caspian Sea, in the independent development of Central Asia and the
Caucasus, and in the fight against terrorism, radical Islam of both the
Shi’a and Sunni brands, and the fundamentalist Wahabi/Salafi Islamic
sects. Besides, they need one another, for Iran to support the US
politically, e.g. in Iraq, and for the US to support Iran economically,
particularly in the high-technology and petroleum sectors.
What
the two sides lack is the political will to normalize after a series of
false starts in the past that have only resulted in increased mutual
distrust. The Iran-Contra fiasco comes to mind, but there have been
others. Building trust and confidence is the key first step towards
US-Iran engagement. In no better way can this be achieved than by a
third party-mediated simultaneous announcements in Tehran and Washington
that the two sides wish to normalize relations and become partners in
ending terrorism, securing peace in the Middle East, fostering nuclear
non-proliferation, and advancing democratic development within the
region. On these and on other issues, one place to start is a broader
conceptualization of common ground and divergences of opinion between
the US and Iran. With the crisis in Iraq, American forces on Iran’s
borders, and the growing tension over Iran’s nuclear programs, a
strategic imperative exists for the two sides to engage in an honest
dialogue.
There are elements on both sides that want to see relations normalized.
Above all are the people of both nations. Polls have shown that over 85
percent of Iranians want Iran to normalize relations with Iran. A Gallup
poll has shown that over 65 percent of Americans do not want a US-Iran
conflict. There are also forces on both sides, however, that do not want
relations to normalize. These include warmongers, ideologues, selfish
regional states, and those with vested personal, organizational, group
or corporate interests. These and other obstacles notwithstanding, the
two governments must make normalization a top priority and make every
effort to achieve it. Normalization is the only hope for a renewed
American-Iranian partnership and the democratization of Iran. If Iran
under various authoritarian regimes has not initiated hostilities, then
a democratic Iran would surely be even more accountable and would not
develop nuclear weapons, support terrorism or oppose the peace in the
Middle East.
More to the point, the US should apply to Iran the approach it has
successfully applied to, for example, South Korea, as opposed to the
approach it has unsuccessfully applied Cuba, Iraq or even Eastern
Europe. The Cuban option, sustained economic sanctions and political
pressure without diplomatic relations, will not serve American interest
in the strategic Middle East, with the world’s largest oil and gas
reserves. This is also a region of significant geo-political
importance, in which Iran has always played a pivotal role. The Iraqi
option for Iran, forced regime change, is even more antithetical to
American interests, as we have argued above, as the situation in Iraq
itself bears daily witness. Yet the best argument against this option is
that it will misuse American power against Iran and will not achieve the
America’s goals of a stable, friendlier, and more democratic Middle
East, including Iran.
The Eastern European option of “velvet revolutions” destroying the
system from within would also be unsuitable in the case of Iran. In the
Eastern European countries, the one-party communist systems were
autocratic and subservient to the former USSR; the regimes were
thoroughly discredited and widely viewed as illegitimate; the opposition
forces were avowedly pro-American; and the population existed for the
most part in an information vacuum. None of these conditions hold in the
case of Iran, which is above all a market economy. Significantly, in
Eastern Europe, religion was in the side of the opposition while in Iran
it is an arm of the theocratic state. The only viable model for the
transformation of Iran is the model provided by South Korea, Taiwan,
South Africa, and several dictatorships in Latin America. To neutralize
the dictators, the US combined diplomatic ties with economic relations
and political pressure for the rule of law, democracy, and human rights.
Unless and until the US and Iran establish diplomatic ties, Iran cannot
be democratized, and to normalize relations, the two sides need to move
beyond confidence building. In exchange for a guaranteed fuel supply for
its nuclear power plants, Iran should suspend uranium enrichment for a
given period of time and implement its agreement with Russia to transfer
spent fuel abroad. To clinch the deal, the EU-US “joint carrot-and stick
strategy” must offer Iran a more lucrative incentives package than
selling spare airplane parts to Iran and accepting Iran as a member in
the World Trade Organization. The deal must not only be big enough to
entice the Iranian Government into accepting it, but also for the
Iranian people to lend their full support to it and stand in opposition
to the regime if it were to reject it.
Iran's national security must be guaranteed, as it lives in a dangerous
neighborhood surrounded by many nuclear states. The best way to achieve
this security is through a regional denuclearization scheme. It would
also help if the United Nations were to promote a global moratorium on
enrichment, as the world’s existing stock of enriched uranium will last
for decades.
IAEA
Director General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei
supports this idea. A
dialogue on Iran’s national security requirements and on a regional
security framework would be another logical step. These measures will
help Tehran justify giving up its right to enrichment, thus maintaining
its national pride. Iran will almost assuredly accept an initiative
along these lines, especially if relations with the US were normalized,
economic sanctions were brought to an end, and the threat of the use of
force against the regime were ruled out.
Resolving the nuclear issue would also open the door for progress on
many other issues. Notable among these are the issues of terrorism and
democratization. These issues are inseparable from one another and from
the nuclear problem, as President Bush has asserted. The challenge is
thus to find the right approach to democratization. Demanding free and
fair elections is the key here, and future Iranian elections will
provide the best hope for a democratic Iran. While giving the
negotiations on the nuclear issue every opportunity to succeed,
Americans must also pay closer attention to these elections.
Specifically, the US should reject regime change and let the Iranian
authorities know that it will work with them only if they allowed for
genuinely competitive elections.
The opposition should follow by making the normalization of
American-Iranian relations their top priority. They must also call for
free elections and the formation of a coalition government that
represents the interests of all the various constituents of Iranian
society. They should let the regime know that they will be prepared to
participate in the political processes if elections are free and fair.
It will not be easy to persuade the regime to normalize relations with
the US and hold free and fair elections. Even if it is unsuccessful, the
call for normalization and free and fair elections by the US, the EU,
and the opposition will mobilize the international community, including
the UN, as well as the grassroots in Iran, generating heavy pressure on
Tehran. Given the serious domestic problems and foreign threats which
the Islamic Republic faces, it will sooner or later yield to such
pressures and agree to hold talks for normalization with the US and to
open the political arena to competition.
About the author:
Hooshang Amirahmadi is a Professor of Planning and
International Development and Director of the Center for Middle Eastern
Studies at Rutgers University, and President of the American Iranian
Council.
www.amirahmadi.com